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INTRODUCTION 
One hundred years ago, in the wake of a global pandemic and a world war, 
suffragists succeeded in having a nineteenth amendment added to the U.S. 
Constitution.1 To bolster support for involving the United States into World War 
I, President Woodrow Wilson argued that joining the war in Europe was 
necessary to protect democracy.2 But suffragists responded that this was a 
hollow battle cry when half the adult population at home could not participate 
in democratic governance.3 Their picketing and lobbying played a significant 
role in finally persuading President Wilson to support the woman suffrage 
amendment.4 In January 1918, President Wilson declared that the federal 
amendment was a “war measure.”5 In September 1918, he emphasized that the 
amendment was “essential to the successful prosecution of the great war of 
humanity in which we are engaged.”6 In so doing, he acknowledged what the 
suffragists had said all along—that a more perfect democracy required the full 
participation of women in governance.  
The text of the Nineteenth Amendment, eventually enacted by Congress in 
1919 and ratified by the requisite thirty-six states in 1920, can best be understood 
as both a prohibition and a grant.7 It did not grant women the right to vote. 
Rather, it prohibited the federal and state governments from abridging or 
denying the privilege of voting based solely on sex.8 But it did grant Congress 
 
1 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 216 (2000). 
2 Id. at 215. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 214-18. 
5 Id. at 216; see also Neil S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A 
Guide for the Centennial, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 235, 243-45 (2020) (describing 
President Wilson’s shift from opponent to supporter of federal suffrage movement, suggesting 
reasons why he might have changed his position). 
6 Id. (quoting S. DOC. NO. 65-284, at 2 (1918)). 
7 The text of the Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
8 Id. In my new book from Oxford University Press, I explore how a narrow or “thin,” 
rather than a more robust or “thick,” interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment emerged by 
the end of the decade after its ratification in 1920. PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORPHAN: GENDER EQUALITY AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT (2020) [hereinafter 
MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN]. Much of the explanation for this puzzle is found in 
the use of narrow statutory construction as a matter of constitutional interpretation and the 
refusal of some state courts to extend the meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment to public 
office holding and jury service, both formal governance functions. Id. at 9-10. My book 
explores how Congress also failed to enact enforcement legislation pursuant to Section 2 of 
the Nineteenth Amendment. Id. at 8. This failure was a missed constitutional opportunity to 
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the power to enforce that prohibition. It doubled the size of the political 
community entitled to full citizenship, if that concept is defined as those 
Americans who hold the apex of political power: eligibility to vote. This effort 
to retrofit the original Constitution was an intergenerational effort spanning 
seventy-two years.9 Thus, public memory is an important part of how we 
celebrate that amendment and how we think about its potential to enhance our 
liberal constitutional democracy today.10 To divine the intentions of the 
American women who lobbied for a federal suffrage amendment, we should 
closely examine the discourse that surrounded that effort. When we conjure that 
memory, we are reminded that a central goal of suffragists in retrofitting the 
Constitution was self-governance. That, in turn, depended on their ability to 
enact laws and policies that furthered self-governance. One goal of suffragists 
in lobbying for the Nineteenth Amendment was to elevate women as citizens 
and create a space for them in the public sphere. It was to recognize their status 
as makers of law and policy on a par with men.11 So one hundred years later, 
how can we still have such a “monosexual democracy”?12  
In their book, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, Professors Tom 
Ginsburg and Aziz Huq look at the connection between constitutional design 
 
complete the task begun by the Amendment itself—to bring all women, including women of 
color, more fully into formal and informal democratic governance. 
9 Id. at 1, 155 & n.1. 
10 In a recent keynote speech celebrating the centennial of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
Professor Reva Siegel focused us on women as constitution makers and reminded us of the 
importance of public or collective memory in constitutionalism: 
[P]ublic memories are a particular kind of memory. . . . When we celebrate the Fourth of 
July we’re celebrating our birth as a nation. . . . [W]hen we tell these stories from 
generation to generation, when we teach these stories from generation to generation, 
we’re forming ourselves as a nation. . . . Collective memory is telling us who “we” are 
and it’s guiding us in our intuitions and debating with one another what a “more perfect 
Union” looks like. 
Reva B. Siegel, Keynote Address at the University of Colorado Law School Ira C. Rothgerber 
Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law: Women’s Enfranchisement: Beyond the 19th 
Amendment at 28:13 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=R43EesUpIb0&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc /UF9H-3ABR]. 
11 See MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN, supra note 8, at 11 (citing Letter from Louise 
McKay to Alice Paul (Aug. 22, 1920) (on file with the Library of Congress)) (identifying 
suffragists’ belief that it was political liberty they had secured upon ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 472 (1995) (“Thus, the Nineteenth Amendment can be understood as 
protecting more generally full rights of political participation.”). 
12 See Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope 
of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1142 (2006) (noting that 
term “monosexual democracy” originated as a way to describe predominantly male 
composition of political class in France). 
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and the health of liberal constitutional democracies.13 They also lay out a three-
part framework to evaluate how likely such a democracy is to either be converted 
to authoritarianism by collapse or—even more likely—by democratic erosion.14 
The metrics in that tripartite benchmarking framework are rule of law, liberal 
rights of speech and association, and free and fair elections.15 Ginsburg and Huq 
explore the salience of those three factors in assessing how well a democracy 
can forestall democratic erosion.16 The latter two metrics, so essential to 
democratic governance, also have particularly gendered dimensions. The full 
participation of women in our democracy is not only morally right—such parity 
is central to both the legitimacy of the state and its continued existence. So it is 
important to examine the role that constitutional design, liberal rights of speech 
and association, and free and fair elections play in women’s ability to engage in 
formal and informal governance. This Essay first describes the state of women’s 
participation in formal and informal governance in our democracy. It then uses 
the benchmarks identified by Ginsburg and Huq as a frame within which to 
identify legislative, judicial, or regulatory mechanisms that could be used to 
make that participation more robust. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL GOVERNANCE 
During the current coronavirus pandemic, we see few women exercising 
political power on the most visible stages. The few that we have seen have been 
subject to misogynistic ridicule by the incumbent President. Our current 
situation reminds me of a conversation I had back in 2006. I had just given 
remarks on gender and constitutional design at a symposium called, “The Most 
Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents and the Rule of Law.”17 A 
woman in the audience came up after the panel and told me that she had been 
working at the State Department on September 11, 2001. She went on to say that 
after the tragic events of that day, all the women “disappeared.” What she meant 
was that women in policy-making positions in the department had been pushed 
into the background as the country and the government moved to a war footing. 
The men in the department had taken over decision-making authority and had 
excluded women from the public policy-making space. 
 
13 TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2018). 
14 Id. at 72-77. 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id. 
17 Paula A. Monopoli, Address at The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, 
Presidents and the Rule of Law: A Symposium on Executive Power (Mar. 24, 2006). My 
symposium panel remarks reflected the ideas proposed in my article, Paula A. Monopoli, 
Gender and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2643 (2006) [hereinafter Monopoli, Gender 
and Constitutional Design]. 
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I was reminded of that conversation as we once again moved as a nation to 
what many have characterized as a war footing in response to a worldwide 
pandemic. My memory is made even more acute in the immediate wake of the 
recent Democratic primaries, in which all of the women candidates eventually 
left the stage.18 There are few women on the President’s White House 
Coronavirus Task Force.19 The head of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, Seema Verma, is a woman of color but was rarely called to the podium 
by the incumbent President at the Task Force’s daily briefings.20 Ambassador-
at-Large and physician Deborah Birx had a prominent role at the daily briefings 
but was often the object of interruption and “mansplaining” by others on the 
stage. In fact, there have been few, if any, women in visible, decision-making 
capacities in the current Administration during what has been the most broadly 
challenging time for our nation since the last world war.  
The female leader who is arguably “the most powerful politician in the 
country” is Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi.21 Pelosi and 
other congressional Democrats were banned from the public signing ceremony 
for the first major governmental effort to combat the pandemic, the Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act.22 The only people standing 
 
18 Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Gender Keep Democratic Women from Winning the 
Presidential Primary?, NPR (Apr. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/17 
/818952460/did-gender-keep-democratic-women-from-winning-the-primary 
[https://perma.cc/5ETB-4A4D]. 
19 See Michael Shear et al., Who’s on the U.S. Coronavirus Task Force, N.Y. TIMES (May 
7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/health/Trump-coronavirus-taskforce.html. 
20 Administrator Verma is of South Asian descent, and her parents emigrated from “tiny 
villages in India” to the United States. Steven Porter, Seema Verma’s American Dream: 
Empower Consumers, Unleash Competition, HEALTHLEADERS (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/strategy/seema-vermas-american-dream-empower-
consumers-unleash-competition. 
21 Lisa Lerer, Nancy Pelosi’s Political Flex, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/politics/on-politics-pelosi-trump.html. 
22 Scott Wong, Pelosi Not Invited by Trump to White House Coronavirus Relief Bill’s 
Signing, HILL (Mar. 27, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/489913-pelosi-
not-invited-by-trump-to-white-house-coronavirus-relief-bills-signing [https://perma.cc 
/2CLU-XNSA]. This was one of many attacks on Pelosi by the incumbent President. Pelosi 
appears to be one of the few political leaders who can successfully unnerve him. See Manu 
Raju, Pelosi and Trump Haven’t Spoken in Five Months, CNN (Mar. 24, 2020, 4:35 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/24/politics/nancy-pelosi-trump-talks/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3D2V-23WW] (describing President’s characterization of Pelosi as “third-
grade politician” after she left meeting and his suggestion that Pelosi should be prosecuted 
after tearing up his State of the Union speech). His attempts to marginalize her have been 
frequent and overtly sexist, including references to her “incompeten[ce]” and characterization 
of her as a “political hack.” See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 
17, 2020, 11:50 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status 
/1251357415045500928?s=20. 
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behind the President and visible in the bill-signing photo-op were White 
Republican men.23 The message was clear—those in power are, and should be, 
White men. And the President’s tone is one of explicit misogyny and disrespect, 
aimed at women who are actually exercising power and leadership. For example, 
on March 27, 2020, the incumbent President said that he had a problem with the 
“governor of Washington” and the “woman in Michigan.”24 The first person he 
referred to by title was male Governor Jay Inslee.25 The second, referred to 
without title, was female Governor Gretchen Whitmer.26 The President admitted 
that he told Vice President Mike Pence that if a governor did not display 
appreciation of the President and the federal government’s efforts, the Vice 
President should not return that governor’s call: “Mike, don’t call the governor 
of Washington. . . . Don’t call the woman in Michigan. . . . You know what I 
say? If they don’t treat you right, I don’t call.”27 He continued his misogynistic 
attack on Twitter and extended it to Mary Barra, CEO of General Motors 
 
23 Cabinet member and Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao and White House 
Coronavirus Task Force member, Coronavirus Response Coordinator, and Ambassador-at-
Large Deborah Birx were in attendance but were not visible in the majority of the photographs 
of the event released by the press pool. See, e.g., Elaine Pofeldt, The Historic $2 Trillion 
CARES Act Will Be an Economic Lifeline for Gig Workers and Freelancers, CNBC (Mar. 30, 
2020, 10:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/30/cares-act-will-be-an-economic-
lifeline-for-gig-workers-freelancers.html [https://perma.cc/ZB2U-AZXH]. 
24 Press Briefing by President Donald Trump, Vice President Mike Pence, and Members 
of the Coronavirus Task Force, The White House (Mar. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Coronavirus 
Press Briefing], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-13/ [https://perma.cc 
/6PBC-MXU9]. 
25 Christina Wilkie & Kevin Breuninger, Trump Says He Told Pence Not to Call 
Governors Who Aren’t ‘Appreciative’ of White House Coronavirus Efforts, CNBC (Mar. 27, 
2020, 8:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/coronavirus-trump-told-pence-not-to-
call-washington-michigan-governors.html [https://perma.cc/3N99-UBSX]. 
26 Id. 
27 Coronavirus Press Briefing, supra note 24. The President said he has a “big problem 
with the young, a woman governor . . . from Michigan.” Mikenzie Frost, Trump of Whitmer: 
‘She is a New Governor, and It’s Not Been Pleasant,’ WWMT (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://wwmt.com/news/state/trump-of-whitmer-she-is-a-new-governor-and-its-not-been-
pleasant [https://perma.cc/XB25-9QZN]. The President labeled her “Gretchen ‘Half’ 
Whitmer” in a March 27 tweet in which he said she was “way in over her head” and “[didn’t] 
have a clue.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 27, 2020, 10:29 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1243726993537073152; see also Allan Smith, 
‘That Woman from Michigan’: Gov. Whitmer Stands Out in the Pandemic. Just Ask Trump., 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020, 7:21 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump 
/woman-michigan-gov-whitmer-stands-out-pandemic-just-ask-trump-n1170506 
[https://perma.cc/U7BS-QEXE]. 
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(“GM”).28 GM was one of the only companies actually ordered by the President 
under the Defense Production Act to produce ventilators.29 It speaks volumes 
that one of the few major American companies to be ordered to produce a 
product under the Defense Production Act was one of the very few led by a 
woman.30  
In the midst of a global pandemic and national emergency of historic 
proportions, women in the United States have been squeezed out of the public 
governing space. While journalists have noted that women lead the countries 
handling the pandemic most effectively,31 in this country, we see few women 
governing on the public stage. The very design of our Constitution helps explain 
the puzzle of why there are so few women exercising power and raising their 
voices in public spaces. We should use the current moment to urge a completion 
of the constitutional retrofitting that began one hundred years ago with the 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.  
 
28 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 27, 2020, 11:16 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1243557418556162050 (“As usual with ‘this’ 
General Motors, things just never seem to work out. They said they were going to give us 
40,000 much needed Ventilators, ‘very quickly’. Now they are saying it will only be 6000, in 
late April, and they want top dollar. Always a mess with Mary B. Invoke ‘P’.”). Note also that 
Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo was forced to dispatch the state police to the Rhode 
Island border to protect her residents from New York residents fleeing the pandemic in New 
York City and its suburbs. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Rhode Island Pulls Over New Yorkers 
to Keep the Virus at Bay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2020/03/28/us/coronavirus-rhode-island-checkpoint.html. New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo pushed back, arguing that this violated the constitutional rights of the citizens of New 
York, and threatening to sue her for impinging on his citizens’ rights. Id. But, notably, he did 
not make similar threats to the male governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, who had announced 
similar rules targeting New Yorkers coming into Florida. See id. 
29 Michael Wayland & Christina Wilkie, Trump Orders General Motors to Make 
Ventilators Under Defense Production Act, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:21 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/trump-orders-general-motors-to-make-ventilators-under-
defense-production-act.html [https://perma.cc/NQF5-QNKD]. The President’s retaliation 
came after failed negotiations with GM and his own refusal to nationalize any company under 
the Defense Production Act. Id. (describing Barra’s refusal to comply with President’s 
demand to reopen closed Lordstown, Ohio GM plant). 
30 See Emma Hinchliffe, The Number of Female CEOs in the Fortune 500 Hits an All-
Time Record, FORTUNE (May 18, 2020, 7:15 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/05/18/women-
ceos-fortune-500-2020/ [https://perma.cc/32CN-XEC8] (reporting that women CEOs lead 
thirty-seven, or 7.4%, of Fortune 500 companies). 
31 See Avivah Wittenberg-Cox, What Do Countries with the Best Coronavirus Responses 
Have in Common? Women Leaders, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2020, 8:27 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/avivahwittenbergcox/2020/04/13/what-do-countries-with-the-
best-coronavirus-reponses-have-in-common-women-leaders/#1a3be663dec4 
[https://perma.cc/63DZ-NT2W]. 
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Any retrofitting of the Constitution leaves gaps in form and function. Much 
like retrofitting a car with an aftermarket sound system, the retrofitted product 
rarely works as well as if the system had been included in the original design. 
Similarly, when we retrofit our Constitution and add features decades later, we 
see that those aftermarket additions, like the Reconstruction Amendments and 
the Nineteenth Amendment, leave gaps to be filled. As a consequence, the 
broader promise of the Nineteenth Amendment—to elevate women as makers 
of law and policy on a par with men—was not fulfilled simply by ratification of 
the Amendment. For example, the United States has yet to have a woman head 
of state and government, unlike many other countries.32 Such retrofitting of the 
Constitution requires additional judicial, legislative, and regulatory action 
beyond ratification to be complete.33 
I have argued previously that much of the explanation for why we have not 
achieved parity in terms of women as makers of law and policy lies in our 
original constitutional design.34 Those design choices also affect how well other 
features of our liberal constitutional democracy—like freedom of speech and 
association, and free and fair elections—function to create an equal governance 
space for women. This insight is particularly salient in a time of rising populism 
nationally and internationally, especially because the authoritarian strain of 
populism tends to valorize agentic male traits and leaders. It may also tend to 
enhance democratic erosion.35 So how did our original constitutional design 
make this lack of female political leadership more likely? And how did 
retrofitting the Constitution to grant women formal political power for the first 
time in 1920 fail to result in more women as makers of law and policy? 
II. GENDERED CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CHOICES  
The Framers’ design choices were informed by ancient gender schemas that 
associated men with reason and women with emotion.36 The premise that 
 
32 See EILEEN MCDONAGH, THE MOTHERLESS STATE: WOMEN’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 112-18 (2009) (noting eighty-five countries that have already 
had women heads of state and government as of 2009). For a similar list as of 2017, see A.W. 
Geiger & Lauren Kent, Number of Women Leaders Around the World Has Grown, but 
They’re Still a Small Group, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/08/women-leaders-around-the-world/ 
[https://perma.cc/5NLF-XQDH]. 
33 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 140-41 (“There are, in short, ample ways to 
change the practice of the Constitution, by legislation, by judiciary, and . . . largely by the 
sheer courage and force of will of the citizenry.”). In this Essay, I extend that insight to the 
development of a constitutional amendment. Ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was 
just the beginning of the process; these other mechanisms must follow in order for the 
intended transformation to be complete. 
34 Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2643-46. 
35 See generally GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 78-83. 
36 Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2645. 
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governance required the ability to reason thus led to the exclusion of women 
from that function.37 The Framers drew on ideas embraced by Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau that the father should be the repository of indivisible authority 
within the family.38 Alexander Hamilton’s argument for a singular executive in 
terms of constitutional design reflects that foundational idea.39 Although heavily 
contested by the Anti-Federalists, the form of executive that emerged from our 
constitutional design process was a singular, consolidated executive with 
plenary power.40 That model echoed the British system we had just overthrown. 
But, as noted above, it was also derived from classical notions of the family as 
the original unit of government with the father as the sole representative to the 
public sphere. Like a father, the president should be the repository of all 
authority. Such authority should not be split if there were to be smooth, decisive 
governance. In other words, the choice of executive model was itself gendered.  
Hamilton’s insistence on the benefits of a singular rather than a plural form 
of executive, such as a multimember council, reflects these ideas about the 
family.41 This unity of power was central to an effective executive in Hamilton’s 
view, and he emphasized the need for a “vigorous Executive.”42 I have argued 
that Hamilton saw vigor and energy, albeit unconsciously, in masculine terms 
and as synonymous with virility.43 He was very concerned with the executive 
being strong enough to defend the new nation and feared weakness in the 
executive, a trait typically associated with the feminine.44 The idea that the 
executive should be able to act unilaterally, without consultation with the 
 
37 Id. (citing DIANA H. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEORY: FROM ANCIENT MISOGYNY 
TO CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM 22-23 (2d ed. 1993) (observing that perceived inability of 
women to reason was justification for their exclusion from citizenship in ancient Greek city-
state)). Ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 signaled a profound change in the 
structure of the American family—replacing virtual political representation by fathers and 
husbands with actual representation for women. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Some Anti-Federalists cautioned against a singular executive exercising power akin to 
a king. See, e.g., Philadelphiensis, The President as Military King (Anti-Federalist No. 74), 
FREEMAN’S J., Feb. 6 & 20, Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
127, 128 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Anti-Federalist No. 74] (“Who can deny 
but the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes, and one of the most 
dangerous kind too; a king elected to command a standing army?”). The writer goes on to 
describe the President under the proposed constitution as even more dangerous because he 
will have “a negative over the proceedings of both branches of the legislature” and because 
“he is neither restrained nor assisted by a privy council, which is a novelty in government.” 
Id. 
41 Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2645. 
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
43 Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2645-46. 
44 Id. at 2646. 
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legislative branch, reflects that fear of more feminine attributes like 
collaboration or consensus building. Hamilton’s vision prevailed over that of the 
Anti-Federalists, who warned against consolidating power in one man and 
urged, at the very least, consultation with a privy council as an alternative.45 
In my previous work, I have identified one consequence of this design choice 
of a consolidated executive: the slow progress of women in formal governance 
positions.46 In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton laid out his case for an energetic and 
singular executive.47 He described this ideal executive as decisive, with the 
ability to act with dispatch—traits essential to being nimble enough to protect 
the young country.48 These “agentic” attributes are not gender neutral. In fact, 
men are seen as more assertive and forceful and women are perceived as more 
nurturing and interpersonally sensitive, which social psychologists characterize 
as “communal” attributes.49 As a result, women are less likely to be seen as 
congruent with an executive who possesses full plenary power to act unilaterally, 
as head of both state and government and with the warrior function associated 
with the commander-in-chief role.50 Such an expansive executive makes it 
difficult to break the stranglehold of our “monosexual” democracy, especially 
given the power of incumbency.  
The Nineteenth Amendment did not alter these original constitutional design 
choices. It simply expanded the political community in terms of who could 
 
45 Anti-Federalist No. 74, supra note 40. 
46 See, e.g., Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17; see also Eileen 
McDonagh & Paula A. Monopoli, The Gendered State and Women’s Political Leadership: 
Explaining the American Puzzle, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 
169, 183-86 (Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2012). 
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 42. 
48 Id. 
49 See Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward 
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 574 (2002) (describing agentic traits as those 
ascribed more strongly to men, including being “aggressive, ambitious, dominant, forceful, 
independent, self-sufficient, self-confident, and prone to act as a leader,” and communal traits 
as those ascribed more strongly to women, including being “affectionate, helpful, kind, 
sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturant, and gentle”); see also Nichole M. Bauer, 
Emotional, Sensitive, and Unfit for Office? Gender Stereotype Activation and Support Female 
Candidates, 36 POL. PSYCHOL. 691, 696-99 (2015) (“The results are consistent: female 
candidates are rated most poorly when stereotypes are activated.”). 
50 See McDonagh & Monopoli, supra note 46, at 177 (“The ancient claim that rulers 
derived their right to rule from their willingness to act in battle to protect those they seek to 
govern is also echoed in the Constitution, which connects the role of president to the role of 
Commander-in-Chief. . . . [B]y vesting the president with the Commander-in-Chief power, 
[the Founders] also retained the connection between the legitimacy of the president’s claim 
to govern with the ancient claim of rulers’ willingness to fight in battle for those they ruled. 
Citizens associate all men with this attribute even though individual men may not choose to 
exercise it . . . . [Thus] voters are unlikely to connect women with the role of Commander-in-
Chief.”). 
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engage in the governance function without adjusting the underlying architecture; 
an architecture that I would argue is skewed toward the masculine. The original 
design choice of a singular (or unitary) executive that combines the head-of-
state, head-of-government, and commander-in-chief function all in one person 
is not only inherently gendered—it has gender consequences. And the impact of 
that design choice can be amplified by executive activism and the power of the 
courts via judicial review to define the scope of the executive as even more 
expansive.51  
The Nineteenth Amendment also did not alter the original design choice of a 
presidential versus a parliamentary system.52 The evidence is mixed as to 
whether such alternative systems benefit women candidates seeking to be the 
head of government.53 In parliamentary systems, voters vote for party 
representatives who, in turn, select a head of the party who may become Prime 
Minister.54 The percentage of American voters who say they would not vote for 
a woman remains high, and a majority of White women voters chose not to vote 
for Hillary Clinton in 2016.55 One could hypothesize that in systems where the 
head-of-government function is separated from the head-of-state function, it 
might be easier to overcome gender bias in voters. The argument goes like this: 
 
51 See generally Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17; see also 
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 135-36 (noting that the trend has been for judicial branch 
to give even more power to executive, especially in times of emergency). 
52 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 176-78 (describing differing features of 
presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary systems). 
53 See HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 132 (2008) (“The statistical and historical evidence 
does not support the conclusion that parliamentary systems are any more likely than 
presidential systems to produce women heads of government.”). But see McDonagh & 
Monopoli, supra note 46, at 178 (“When we turn to democracies comparable to the United 
States, we find presidential systems that are much less marked by a unitary executive. Rather 
the executive branch of government is characterized by fragmentation, often including a split 
between a head of state and a head of government, as well as a greater connection with the 
legislative branch of government in the form of parliamentary association, if not control, of 
the executive branch.”). 
54 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 176-78. 
55 An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Aug. 9, 2018) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CENTER], https://www.pewresearch.org/politics 
/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RF2-WKPS]. In a June 2019 poll by Ipsos for the Daily Beast, a majority 
of Democratic and Independent voters said that they are comfortable voting for a woman 
president but that they do not think their neighbors are comfortable voting for a woman. Press 
Release, Ipsos, Nominating Woman or Minority Come Second to Nominating Candidate Who 
Can Beat Trump 5 (June 17, 2019), https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news 
/documents/2019-06/daily-beast-gender-topline-2019-06-17-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8CE-
J4KR]. Only 33% of survey respondents believed their neighbors would be comfortable with 
a female president. Id. 
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if voters simply vote for party representatives who themselves select the prime 
minister, then those party representatives might be better able to overcome 
gender schemas about masculine and feminine traits because they know the 
candidate in a much more personal way. Thus, it might be more likely that we 
would see a female head of government. And, indeed, in western democracies 
that are similar to us in norms and culture, we see that those who have had female 
heads of government tend to fragment the roles, separating the head-of-
government from the head-of-state and commander-in-chief functions.56 Many 
of those have either semi-presidential or parliamentary systems for selecting the 
head of government.57  
For example, in 2016 we saw two viable female candidates in a parliamentary 
system vying for the position of prime minister in the United Kingdom, with 
Theresa May prevailing.58 It is notable, however, that after several years of 
failing to gain a sufficient vote for her Brexit plan, May was forced to step down 
and was replaced with the agentic “bad boy,” Boris Johnson. Unlike the hard-
working, well-prepared May, Johnson is a disheveled, big-picture guy. Yet, 
unlike May, Johnson won more seats in Parliament for his party when he called 
a snap election and was able to get a vote in favor of his Brexit plan within 
months.59 Similarly, in our most recent Democratic primary, we saw the 
rejection of a female candidate with detailed policy prescriptions, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren.60 So it is not clear if gender bias can be neutralized by the 
 
56 McDonagh & Monopoli, supra note 46, at 178. 
57 Id. at 178-79. 
58 Steven Erlanger, A Woman Will Lead Britain for 1st Time Since Thatcher, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 8, 2016, at A6. While still Prime Minister, May was pushed to declare whether she had 
confidence in Johnson, who was her Foreign Secretary. Lizzy Buchan, Theresa May Backs 
Boris Johnson Amid Claims He Is Seen As a ‘Joke’ By Diplomats, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 29, 
2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-boris-johnson 
-bakc-foreign-secretary-white-house-joke-diplomats-cabinet-europe-eu-a7918736.html 
[https://perma.cc/XYT3-EJ4G]. A number of officials and business leaders had asked 
journalists why May as Prime Minister had appointed “a fool” as her Foreign Secretary. See 
id. (“Intelligence chiefs were . . . wary of sharing sensitive information with [Johnson], while 
civil servants were ‘horrified’ by his lack of discipline . . . .”). So Johnson’s being named 
Prime Minister to succeed May and then securing a vote in Parliament for his Brexit plan is 
particularly telling in terms of the salience of gender schemas in politics. 
59 Tim Ross et al., Boris Johnson’s Overwhelming Election Victory Upends Britain, 
FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/12/13/boris-johnson-election-
victory-upends-britain/ [https://perma.cc/R5EA-66F5]. 
60 Senator Warren came in third in her own state of Massachusetts. Ella Nilsen, Why 
Elizabeth Warren Lost Her Home State of Massachusetts, VOX (Mar. 3, 2020, 10:31 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/3/21161603/bernie-sanders-beat-elizabeth-warren-in-
massachusetts [https://perma.cc/M9QJ-CJNT]. A candidate’s performance in their own state 
has traditionally been a significant indicator of strength or weakness. But note that 
Massachusetts has a history of failing to elect women to statewide or federal office, so the 
traditional indicator was arguably less salient in Senator Warren’s case. See id. 
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type of system chosen—presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary—in 
designing a constitutional democracy. And if the current pandemic is akin to 
war, we are likely to see American voters retreating into gendered stereotypes 
that male leaders can best protect them in a time of national emergency.61 If a 
broad understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment as a mechanism by which 
women could participate fully in formal and informal governance is to be 
fulfilled, then it is important to understand how these design features of our 
Constitution may inhibit that goal.62  
The Nineteenth Amendment ensured that states could not deny women 
eligibility to vote based solely on their sex. That Amendment engendered 
tremendous fear when it was ratified in 1920—both a fear of profound change 
in the social order and a fear of the impact of a massive expansion of the polity 
on the American political order.63 The Amendment’s retrofitting of the 
Constitution was challenged as an “unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment.”64 The theory was that the Amendment so expanded the electorate 
that it violated the basic compact between the original states and the federal 
government, undermining the individual autonomy of each state.65 The Supreme 
Court rejected that theory and affirmed the decision below that the Amendment 
had been validly ratified.66 Despite these concerns about its impact, the 
Nineteenth Amendment and its tremendous expansion of the electorate did not 
have a significant effect on the outcome of presidential elections for many years 
after its ratification.67 However, in 1980, the so-called gender gap in voting 
 
61 Note that in a national security emergency, Americans have indicated that they are even 
more inclined to seek male leadership. See Jennifer L. Lawless, Women, War, and Winning 
Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era, 57 POL. RES. Q. 479, 487 
(2004). This reifies agentic constitutional design flaws. 
62 See Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2650. 
63 See MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN, supra note 8, at 4. 
64 Id. at 8; see also id. at 21-42. 
65 Id. 
66 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1922). 
67 J. KEVIN CORDER & CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, COUNTING WOMEN’S BALLOTS: FEMALE 
VOTERS FROM SUFFRAGE THROUGH THE NEW DEAL 281 (2016). But this should not be the sole 
measure of its success. Many scholars have explored the much broader meaning of the 
Nineteenth Amendment in their work. See generally, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth 
Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE L.J. F. 450 (2020); Tracy A. 
Thomas, More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment As Proxy for Gender Equality, 15 
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 349 (2020). 
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began to emerge.68 Women as a bloc began to swing presidential elections.69 But 
that bloc did not hold—at least among White women voters—in 2016, despite 
the historic gender gap in favor of Hillary Clinton in pre-election polls.70 Given 
the fate of all of the female candidates for the Democratic presidential 
nomination in 2020, it is not clear when women may finally break the gender 
 
68 The gender gap in voting is “the difference in the percentage of women and the 
percentage of men voting for a given candidate.” Gender Gap in Voting, CTR. FOR AM. 
WOMEN & POL., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/voters/gender_gap [https://perma.cc 
/5Q2S-YFYF] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020). Leading up to the 2016 election, the gender gap 
was as large as it had ever been. Danielle Paquette, The Unexpected Voters Behind the Widest 
Gender Gap in Recorded Election History, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:45 PM). Statistician 
Nate Silver characterized it as “a massive gender split” in favor of Hillary Clinton, with her 
advantage among women averaging fifteen percent. Nate Silver, Election Update: Women 
Are Defeating Donald Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 11, 2016, 6:26 PM), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/election-update-women-are-defeating-donald-trump/ 
[https://perma.cc/HM7S-T6MM]. Silver concluded that “if Trump loses the election, it will 
be because women voted against him.” Id. Silver’s post gave rise to the hashtag 
#Repealthe19th, reflecting his observation that candidate Donald Trump would win if only 
men voted. US Election 2016: #repealthe19th Tweets Urge US Women to be Denied Vote, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37639738 
[https://perma.cc/UG7Q-CBTD]. But clearly Silver and the pundits were wrong. Clinton lost 
the election. While a majority of all women voters voted for Clinton, a majority of White 
women did not. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 55. The vast majority of Black women, 
however, voted for Clinton. Khushbu Shah, Black Female Voters to Democrats: ‘You Won’t 
Win the White House Without Us,’ GUARDIAN (Apr 26, 2019, 6:46 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/apr/26/black-women-voters-democrats-
presidential-2020-african-american [https://perma.cc/H8JE-G2C5]. 
69 CORDER & WOLBRECHT, supra note 67, at 272 (“[W]ithout the Nineteenth Amendment, 
Mitt Romney may well have been elected president in 2012. Exit polls showed Romney 
securing 52 percent of men’s votes, while 55 percent of the women cast their ballots for 
Barack Obama.” (citations omitted)). 
70 See Press Release, Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, Historic Gender Gap Isn’t Enough 
to Propel Clinton to Victory in 2016 Presidential Race (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/post-election-gg-release-2016-
presidential.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X3Y-TRZJ]. But there are signs of progress. See Jennifer 
M. Piscopo, States of Feminist Resistance: Women Legislators Make a Difference, MS. (Apr. 
13, 2020), https://msmagazine.com/2020/04/13/states-of-feminist-resistance-how-
progressive-women-legislators-make-a-difference/ [https://perma.cc/8X99-ZE2D] 
(describing significant 3.5% increase in women state legislators after 2018 election). And note 
that women’s voting patterns explain how the Democrats took back the House of 
Representatives in 2018. Press Release, Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, Women Voters 
Propel Democratic Takeover of U.S. House of Representatives; Large Gender Gaps Apparent 
in Most 2018 Senate and Gubernatorial Races (Nov. 8, 2018), http://cawp.rutgers.edu 
/sites/default/files/resources/press-release-women-voters-2018_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F37H-ZCLS]. 
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barrier to the presidency.71 And part of the explanation for why we have lagged 
so far behind in expanding women’s role as makers of law and policy may be 
found in the original design of our Constitution. In particular, the Framers’ 
choice of a consolidated executive with plenary power, subject to the power of 
the judicial branch to interpret its scope in an expansive way, was not only 
gendered—it has continuing gender consequences.  
The rise of recent populist executive activism is by its very nature associated 
with the masculine—agentic, outsized traits like those exercised by the 
incumbent President. In the past, we have seen other examples of executive 
activists that embody these traits, such as former Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, who derided his opponents in the legislature in explicitly 
gendered terms as “girlie men.”72 But especially in this time of pandemic, we 
need more women making law and policy and need fewer agentic, populist 
leaders. Not to be essentialist, but as some observers have noted, the best 
outcomes during the pandemic have arguably come in countries headed by 
women.73 Thus, one could argue that agentic, chest thumping has put us in 
more—not less—danger: 
 Now, compare these [female] leaders [in Germany, Taiwan, New 
Zealand, Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Denmark] and stories with the 
strongmen using the crisis to accelerate a terrifying trifecta of 
authoritarianism: blame-“others,” capture-the-judiciary, demonize-the-
journalists, and blanket their country in I-will-never-retire darkness 
 
71 See Kurtzleben, supra note 18 (identifying close primary races, concerns about ). It is 
notable, however, that women may break the barrier to the presidency through the vice 
presidency. 2020 Democratic nominee Joe Biden has named a woman, Senator Kamala 
Harris, to the ticket. Alexander Burns & Katie Glueck, Harris Joins Biden Ticket, Achieving 
a First, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2020, at A1. 
72 Peter Nicholas, Schwarzenegger Deems Opponents ‘Girlie-Men’—Twice/Governor’s 
Rhetoric Incites Mall Crowd, Infuriates Others, SFGate (July 18, 2004, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Schwarzenegger-deems-opponents-girlie-men-
2707461.php [https://perma.cc/3EDN-JLRL]. For an analysis of how this comment was used 
in several contexts to conjure gendered attributes like weakness, see Joanna Grossman & 
Linda McClain, The “Girlie Men” Slur and Similar Insults: How They Show the Persistence 
of Sex-Role Stereotypes, FINDLAW (Sept. 21, 2004), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-
commentary/the-girlie-men-slur-and-similar-insults.html [https://perma.cc/6EQM-TVTM]. 
73 See Wittenberg-Cox, supra note 31 (noting that these women prime ministers and 
presidents have been among the most effective in controlling coronavirus spread and death 
rates). But see Jennifer M. Piscopo, Women Leaders and Pandemic Performance: A Spurious 
Correlation, POL. & GENDER (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2), 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view 
/69FA5BD035CEE66F0FFFC61DF037DD0E/S1743923X20000525a.pdf/women_leaders_
and_pandemic_performance_a_spurious_correlation.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4A4-33UP]. 
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(Trump, Bolsanaro, López Obrador, Modi, Duterte, Orban, Putin, 
Netanyahu. . .).74 
It is not likely that we will amend the Constitution to transform our 
consolidated, singular executive model into, for example, a more collaborative, 
consensus-based three-person council. But we could push for a more constrained 
choice on the part of courts as to the elusive boundary between Congress and the 
President, a line that has moved over time toward encompassing more power 
within the executive.75 And we could push for more relational, consensus-based 
checks and balances across the branches. For example, Ginsburg and Huq 
suggest a number of horizontal measures of interbranch accountability, 
including members of Congress serving in the Cabinet.76 
III. LIBERAL RIGHTS OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 
We have long had tremendous gender disparity in the number of women 
who write op-eds and letters to the editor, who are quoted as experts by the 
media, and who are selected as “talking heads” on television news shows.77 
These are all forms of using one’s voice to participate in informal governance. 
One theory for why this disparity exists is that women lack the confidence to 
express themselves and believe they are not expert enough to contribute. 
Catherine Orenstein, founder of The Op-Ed Project, has suggested that:  
 By telling themselves they’re not experts in anything, “women are 
pulling themselves out of the discussion . . . . A lot of them will in some 
way discount themselves and their knowledge. If you think about it, what 
 
74 Wittenberg-Cox, supra note 31 (third alteration in original). 
75 See McDonagh and Monopoli, supra note 46, at 179 (citing Stephen Skowronek, The 
Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the 
Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2075 (2009)); see also GINSBURG & HUQ, supra 
note 13, at 222-30. 
76 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 150-54 (arguing for more intrabranch 
institutions of horizontal accountability, but noting that such mechanisms to enhance 
consensus-based decision-making are somewhat in “tension with the Madisonian account of 
mutually checking branches”); see also id. at 192-97, 217-18 (giving examples of what such 
checking institutions could look like and how they could be developed). 
77 Erika Fry, It’s 2012 Already: Why Is Opinion Writing Still Mostly Male?, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (May 29, 2012), https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/its_2012 
_already_why_is_opinio.php [https://perma.cc/43V7-UJS6] (providing statistics on 
disproportionate number of male bylines and noting how men act as gatekeepers of women’s 
voices in this regard). White men contributed 82% of op-eds in the Wall Street Journal, 74% 
of op-eds in the New York Times, and 71% of op-eds in the Washington Post. Id.; see also 
Taryn Yaeger, The Byline Survey Report, 2012: Who Narrates the World?, BYLINE BLOG 
(May 28, 2012), https://theopedproject.wordpress.com/2012/05/28/the-byline-survey-2011/ 
[https://perma.cc/M5FX-PUAF]. 
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it means is that there’s a disconnect between what we know and our sense 
that it actually matters.”78  
But there is also an increasingly important reason why women are withdrawing 
their voices from the public sphere. “Women are also more likely than men to 
face harassment when they publish their opinions. ‘Speaking up makes you a 
target[.]’ . . . So when they consider writing a letter, women have to ask 
themselves: ‘Do I want to be that target?’”79 
As noted above, there are few visible women on the current Administration’s 
White House Coronavirus Task Force and in speaking roles at its briefings.80 
This reflects a broader pattern of the President’s unwillingness to put women in 
power. The women who are in power, like Speaker Pelosi and Governor 
Whitmer, draw his ire.81 The President’s marginalizing behavior undermines 
them and the idea of female political leadership more generally.82 His 
devaluation of their voices and his attacks on women in the press—particularly 
 
78 Caroline Kitchener, Why Do So Few Women Write Letters to the Editor?, ATLANTIC 
(May 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/05/why-do-so-few-
women-write-letters-to-the-editor/559736/. 
79 Id.; see also Kimberly Probolus, Letter to the Editor, A Woman’s Plea: Let’s Raise Our 
Voices!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2019, at SR10 (highlighting New York Times’s failure to have 
gender parity in its opinion writers, noting that “the preponderance of men was off the 
charts”). In response to Probolus’s letter, the New York Times sought more op-ed submissions 
from women and received a number of replies from women explaining why they were hesitant 
to write op-eds. Andrea Jones et al., Letters to the Editor, Encouraging Women’s Voices: Part 
2, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/10/opinion/letters 
/nytimes-letters-to-the-editor-women.html. 
80 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
81 See supra notes 22, 24-27 and accompanying text. 
82 For example, the President used a tweet that said “LIBERATE MICHIGAN” to 
encourage the occupation of the Michigan statehouse by a group of heavily armed protestors, 
challenging Governor Whitmer’s authority to extend her pandemic lockdown order. See 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2020, 11:22 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1251169217531056130. Echoing attacks on 
Hillary Clinton, the protestors chanted, “Lock her up.” Andrew Solender, Armed Protestors 
Storm Michigan State House over COVID-19 Lockdown, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:25 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2020/04/30/armed-protesters-storm-
michigan-state-house-over-covid-19-lockdown/#6dd4d02769b5 [https://perma.cc/ST8W-
JDN7]. The President’s Twitter attacks are also intended to diminish Speaker Pelosi in the 
eyes of his base and to make her a target for their anger. See Molly Roberts, Opinion, A 
Rorschach Test for America, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2019, at A19 (commenting on President’s 
tweet of a photo of Pelosi pointing at him during a meeting, “Progressives look at the image 
and see a woman doing her job well and powerfully. They see a petulant man with his lips 
open to interrupt her and the men around him with their hands clasped and heads down in 
submission. Trump supporters look at it and see, well, a meltdown. Here’s a lady throwing a 
hissy fit in the White House, and how dare she display such disrespect toward her exalted 
host?”). 
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women of color—illustrate why we should call for a reconsideration of hate 
speech rules, one mechanism for protecting the voices of marginalized groups 
within our society.83 Similar attacks on women have effectively chilled speech 
in the public sphere and call us to consider legislation that limits such attacks.84 
Hate speech rules that protect women’s voices are a way without 
constitutional amendment to cabin the impact of gendered design choices in the 
original Constitution. While this approach clearly has risks in terms of liberal 
constitutional democracy, half of the voting population has been silenced in the 
current world of the Internet. The chilling effect of anonymous comments after 
newspaper op-eds or on social media platforms like Facebook, which implicitly 
or explicitly threaten physical violence, has a disparate impact on women. Many 
female bloggers or writers of op-eds have retreated from publishing their work.85 
We need intervention through legislation or through regulatory pressure on 
online platforms to ensure robust rights of speech, petition, virtual assembly, and 
association for women.86 Such legislative and regulatory intervention is worth 
the trade-offs in terms of First Amendment concerns, given that half of the 
 
83 See Annie Karni, Trump’s Virus Defense Is Often an Attack, and the Target Is Often a 
Woman, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/us 
/politics/trump-women-coronavirus.html; see also Leia Idliby, CNN’s Dana Bash Challenges 
Trump’s Treatment of Female Reporters: ‘It’s Different,’ MEDIAITE (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:31 
AM), https://www.mediaite.com/tv/cnns-dana-bash-challenges-trumps-treatment-of-female-
reporters-its-different/ [https://perma.cc/BL2P-JCR2]. For discussion of the President’s 
attacks on female reporters of color, in particular, see Fiona Pestana, We Heart: Women 
Reporters of Color Taking Trump to Task, MS. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://msmagazine.com/2020 
/04/03/we-heart-women-reporters-of-color-taking-trump-to-task/ [https://perma.cc/6B2P-
YQYM]; Erik Wemple, Yamiche Alcindor Wants an Answer, Thank You Very Much, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 30, 2020, 6:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/30 
/yamiche-alcindor-wants-an-answer-thank-you-very-much/. 
84 Note that my point about the President’s comments is merely illustrative of the broader 
chilling effect of misogyny, and I am not actually arguing that such legislation would be 
upheld vis-à-vis the President’s speech. However, it is notable that the government speech 
doctrine is not unlimited. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-69 (2009). 
85 See, e.g., Vanessa Thorpe & Richard Rogers, Women Bloggers Call for a Stop to 
‘Hateful’ Trolling by Misogynist Men, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2011, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/05/women-bloggers-hateful-trolling 
[https://perma.cc/XSE8-5JA4]. A survey by Amnesty International found that 33% of women 
in the United States reported being harassed online. Azmina Dhrodia, Unsocial Media: The 
Real Toll of Online Abuse Against Women, MEDIUM (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://medium.com/amnesty-insights/unsocial-media-the-real-toll-of-online-abuse-against-
women-37134ddab3f4 [https://perma.cc/34EX-HBMG]. More than 75% of overall survey 
respondents said that the harassment they faced led to changes in how they use social media 
and other online platforms. Id. 
86 See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) 
(describing variety of harms caused by cyber-harassment, evaluating current state of law, and 
proposing new legislative and judicial interventions). 
  
2020] WOMEN, DEMOCRACY & THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT 1745 
 
electorate is being targeted by gendered attacks.87 Otherwise, we are shrinking 
the public sphere for women, contrary to the broader promise of the Nineteenth 
Amendment to bring gender parity to our formal and informal governance 
structures.88 
IV. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 
The Nineteenth Amendment retrofitted the Constitution by doubling the 
electorate. Professor Akhil Amar has described this moment as “the single 
biggest democratizing event in American history” and went on to note that 
“[e]ven the most extraordinary feats of the Founding and Reconstruction eras 
had involved the electoral empowerment and/or enfranchisement of hundreds of 
thousands, not millions . . . .”89 But that amendment took seventy-two years to 
enact.90 It is easier to revisit more rigorous enforcement of amendments that we 
already have than to amend the Constitution again. We have the Nineteenth 
Amendment. What emerged after a decade of interpretation of the Amendment 
was a thin conception of its meaning as a mere nondiscrimination-in-voting rule 
and not a broader equality norm.91 As noted above, we can still fulfill the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s broader promise by making our executive less 
expansive and more accountable and by making political speech less risky for 
women. Both of these goals can be achieved without constitutional amendment 
via case law made by the judicial branch, statutes enacted by the legislative 
branch, and regulations promulgated by the executive branch. There is also a 
third space in which we can intervene to help fulfill the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s broader promise: free and fair elections. Not only did courts 
historically embrace a thin conception of the Amendment that we could now 
make more robust, but Congress never used the enforcement clause of Section 2 
of the Nineteenth Amendment. No enforcement or civil rights legislation has 
ever been enacted pursuant to that enforcement clause, even though such 
legislation was introduced in Congress upon ratification in 1920.92  
 
87 For a discussion of the trade-offs raised by hate speech bans in a liberal constitutional 
democracy, see GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 172. 
88 For a discussion of how democratic erosion is characterized by such a shrinking of the 
public sphere, see id. at 197-98. 
89 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 419 (paperback ed. 
2006). 
90 See Thomas, supra note 67, at 1. 
91 See generally MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN, supra note 8, at 2, 4. 
92 See id. at 8, 43-69 (surfacing history around congressional debates about enforcement 
clause and fate of enforcement legislation introduced in 1920, and emphasizing central role 
of race in that story). 
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Recent voter suppression efforts by state legislatures—for example, voter ID 
laws—have a disparate impact on women, particularly women of color:93 
[O]ne third of all women have citizenship documents that do not identically 
match their current names primarily because of name changes at marriage. 
Roughly 90 percent of women who marry adopt their husband’s last name. 
That means that roughly 90 percent of married female voters have a 
different name on their ID than the one on their birth certificate. An 
estimated 34 percent of women could be turned away from the polls unless 
they have precisely the right documents. . . .  
  . . . 
 . . . [T]he U.S. Patriot Act requires women’s names on certain official 
government documents to be the same. Thanks to the Department of 
Homeland Security and the ever-tightening regulations on identification 
requirements, today a woman with a hyphenated name on one form of ID 
and just a maiden name on another is grounds for suspicion. Patriot Act 
guidelines specifically require identical forms of identification, which for 
many women, imposes a significant challenge.94 
 
93 NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, VOTER SUPPRESSION TARGETS WOMEN, YOUTH AND 
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (ISSUE ADVISORY, PART ONE) 2 (Aug. 2014), http://now.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Voter-Suppression-Targets-Women-Youth-and-Communities-of-
Color-Issue-Advisory-Part-One.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ7A-QQ8E]; see also Barbara 
Arnwine & Eleanor Smeal, The War on Voting Is a War on Women, MSNBC (Oct. 20, 2013, 
5:59 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-war-voting-war-women [https://perma.cc 
/FQM3-BN68] (describing impact of such laws on women voting in the 2008 and 2012 
elections: “Women make up the majority of student voters, elderly voters, and minority 
voters, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Women have led voter turnout among eligible 
voters in every race that the Census Bureau has recorded since 1996 by three to four points. 
Nationwide, close to 60% of college students are women, and they voted at higher rates than 
college men in both the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. Women over 65 vote in larger 
numbers than men in that cohort, and voter turnout is also higher among African-American 
women and Latinas, who have seen significant increases in voter participation since 2004. In 
fact, in 2012, black women had the highest turnout of all voting groups at 66%.”); Mandy 
Velez, The Surprising Ways Voter Suppression Particularly Hurts Women, SALON (Jan. 14, 
2018, 12:29 AM), https://www.salon.com/2018/01/13/the-surprising-ways-voter-suppression 
-particularly-hurts-women_partner/ [https://perma.cc/8LG3-H3HB] (describing how voter ID 
laws affect particular subgroups of women, including those who are poor or work hourly wage 
jobs; women who are abused; students, since a higher proportion of college students are 
women; and disabled/older women); Reid Wilson, Five Reasons Voter Identification Bills 
Disproportionately Impact Women, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2013, 10:35 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/05/five-reasons-voter-
identification-bills-disproportionately-impact-women/ (describing disparate impact on 
women of voter suppression laws in Texas). 
94 NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, supra note 93, at 3-4. 
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In this centennial year of the Nineteenth Amendment, new scholarship has 
emerged arguing that Congress should finally use the Amendment’s 
enforcement clause to invalidate state legislation that constricts voting.95 For 
example, given the gender pay gap—especially for women of color—there is a 
disparate impact built into voting rules like Florida’s recent legislation requiring 
former felons to pay all fees, fines, and restitution prior to re-enfranchisement.96 
Unfortunately, a recent U.S. District Court decision adopted a narrow view of 
the Nineteenth Amendment and found that it should be interpreted, like the 
Fifteenth Amendment, to require intentional discrimination to sustain a 
constitutional rights violation claim.97 Thus, it may well require further 
congressional enforcement legislation to provide a foundation for courts to allow 
disparate impact claims under the Nineteenth Amendment. The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 itself could be amended to add sex as a prohibited criterion for 
abridging or denying the franchise, or separate legislation could be enacted 
providing for a statutory basis for a disparate impact claim.98 As noted above, 
the Nineteenth Amendment is both a prohibition and a grant.99 It is designed to 
constrain the states, and Congress should look closely at using the power it was 
granted under Section 2 of the Nineteenth Amendment as we celebrate its 
centennial. 
CONCLUSION 
A significant number of Americans polled still indicate that, while they are 
comfortable voting for a woman for President, their neighbors are not.100 As 
described above, politicians like the incumbent President still play on gender 
 
95 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thin and Thick Conceptions of the 
Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, 108 GEO. L.J. 27, 
47, 55-59 (2020) (proposing “a litigation strategy premised on a revived Nineteenth 
Amendment within the scope of a cluster of new voting rights claims”). 
96 2019 Fla. Laws 162 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2020)); see also McCoy, et al. v. 
Desantis, et al., SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case-
docket/mccoy-et-al-v-desantis-et-al [https://perma.cc/ZC2M-ANLV] (last visited Sept. 27, 
2020). 
97 Jones v. DeSantis, No. 4:19-cv-00300, 2020 WL 2618062, at *35 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 
2020), rev’d and vacated on other grounds, 2020 WL 5493770 (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2020). 
98 See Steve Kolbert, The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power (But First, Which 
One Is the Nineteenth Amendment, Again?), 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 507, 564 (2016). 
99 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
100 See Press Release, Ipsos, supra note 55, at 5. Only 33% of survey respondents believed 
their neighbors would be comfortable with a female president. Id. Pollsters often say that is a 
more reliable number since people are unwilling to say that they themselves are not 
comfortable with a female president. See Michelle Cottle, Opinion, Are We Ready to Elect a 
Woman President?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2020, at A22. 
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schemas in appealing to potential voters. During the 2016 election cycle, then-
candidate Donald Trump sarcastically asked his audience, “And she looks 
presidential, fellows?” when referring to Hillary Clinton.101 Clearly, such gender 
schemas about competence and fitness to govern still play a salient role in our 
politics. This reifies the catch-22 that female candidates face: either be punished 
for behaving in an agentic way because such behavior goes against gender norms 
or face pushback if they behave in collaborative ways since such behavior is 
incongruent with our agentic executive model.102 There is evidence that voters 
“fit” the candidate to the office.103 For example, research demonstrates that 
voters are more likely to select female candidates if they are running for 
legislative offices that voters associate more closely with communal behavior 
like collaboration.104 Thus, how we structure the office itself matters. The 
Framers of our Constitution chose an expansive, agentic executive model—the 
very kind of model we would predict voters would match a candidate with 
masculine traits to more readily than a candidate with feminine traits.105 And the 
Supreme Court has chosen to expand the role of the executive at various times 
 
101 Ashley Parker, Donald Trump Says Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Have ‘a Presidential 
Look,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/us/politics/donald-
trump-says-hillary-clinton-doesnt-have-a-presidential-look.html?_r=0. For examples of the 
gendered nature of the 2016 presidential campaign and its discourse, see my remarks given 
prior to the election, published in Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and the Structural Constitution, 
76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 17, 21 (2016). The 2016 presidential election was striking in terms 
of having a candidate who openly mocked the appearance of female candidates and who 
played so crudely on gender schemas about who is suited to be a political leader. See, e.g., 
Amy Chozick & Patrick Healy, Sharing a Stage, Trump and Fiorina Will Face Complicated 
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2015, at A17. 
102 VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW?: THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 133-34 (1998) 
(“Having a style that is assertive[,] . . . rather than cooperative and participative, is especially 
costly for a woman.”); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes 
and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 743 (2001) (“If [women] enact 
agentic behaviors . . . [they] suffer a backlash effect in the form of social repercussions.”); see 
also Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2649. 
103 See VALIAN, supra note 102, at 134 (“[L]eaders are likely to be judged in terms of the 
fit between their sex and the conception of the job. If the job is seen as masculine, men will 
be considered more effective leaders, but if the job is characterized as feminine, women will 
be perceived as better leaders.” (citation omitted)); see also McDonagh & Monopoli, supra 
note 46, at 181. 
104 Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2649 (citing Carol 
Mueller, Nurturance and Mastery: Competing Qualifications for Women’s Access to High 
Public Office?, 2 RES. POL. & SOC’Y 211, 214 (1986)). 
105 See McDonagh & Monopoli, supra note 46, at 179 (“It is clear why the voters associate 
executive political leadership with men rather than with women, given the fundamental way 
the contemporary modern state in general and the executive branch in particular represent 
male traits, even in a democracy.” (citing GENDER POWER, LEADERSHIP, AND GOVERNANCE 
(Georgia Duerst-Lahti & Rita Mae Kelly eds., 1995))). 
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in our history.106 Thus, the fact that we lag behind other liberal constitutional 
democracies in female leadership is not surprising given our uniquely expansive 
executive. 
When polled, voters respond to gender schemas and rate masculine traits as 
preferable to feminine traits for all levels of political office.107 After September 
11th, voters were even more concerned about security, and this had an impact 
on their willingness to accept female political leaders.108 Voters have 
traditionally seen male candidates as better equipped to deal with national 
security issues.109 In fact, some scholars linked a decline in the number of voters 
who reported that they would vote for a female candidate for President in the 
wake of September 11th to the increase in concern about national security at that 
time.110 The current pandemic may be akin to war for these purposes, or it may 
be that voters associate it with health and caregiving and seek female leadership 
as a result.111 In a remarkable invocation of her status as a mother as the basis 
for her moral authority, Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms called on her 
constituents and all Americans to dismantle systemic racism and embrace reform 
in response to the death of George Floyd, yet another person in a long line of 
Black men and women who have been the victims of police violence.112 During 
a subsequent press conference in response to property destruction amidst 
otherwise peaceful protests of police violence, Mayor Bottoms began by saying, 
“Above everything else, I am a mother. I am a mother to four black children in 
 
106 Id.; see also GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 144. 
107 Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2646-47 (citing 
Lawless, supra note 61, at 482). 
108 Lawless, supra note 61, at 485. 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2647 (citing 
Lawless, supra note 61, at 482); see also, e.g., Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender 
As a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits, 46 POL. RES. Q. 527, 535 (1993) (noting 
that 53.1% of voters thought that a man was better equipped to manage military spending, 
compared to 16.3% of voters who believed a woman was better equipped); Jennifer Agiesta, 
Poll: Nine Weeks Out, a Near Even Race, CNN (Sept. 7, 2016, 11:42 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/06/_politics-zone-injection/trump-vs-clinton-presidential-
polls-election-2016/ [https://perma.cc/N2JP-HGHD] (reporting that voters trusted Trump 
over Clinton on terrorism, 51% to 45%, but trusted Clinton over Trump on foreign policy, 
56% to 40%). 
111 In some cases of female executive leadership, we have seen that gender schemas may 
actually work in women’s favor: “For example, in Chile, many people stated that they voted 
for President Michelle Bachelet because they were looking for a different, more 
compassionate approach to governance. Thus, traditional gender schemas did play a role in 
electoral choices—they simply worked in favor of the female candidate.” Monopoli, Gender 
and Constitutional Design, supra note 17, at 2650. 
112 Keisha Lance Bottoms, Opinion, When You Can’t Save Your Boy, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2020, at A27. 
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America, one of whom is 18 years old.”113 She then called on those engaged in 
such destruction to “go home” and told them they were “disgracing our city.”114 
In so doing, the Mayor drew on motherhood as her authority for leading 
politically. While one strain of the argument for woman suffrage was the moral 
superiority of women and the benefit that would bring to governance, this was a 
different kind of invocation of motherhood. It evoked power. It connected 
motherhood to the exercise of political authority over citizens. Rare in American 
political rhetoric, perhaps this is a harbinger of a new kind of source of women’s 
leadership in this country. Its impact on women’s formal political leadership 
remains to be seen. 
The progress of women as makers of law and policy has ebbed and flowed. 
In terms of formal political office, we are far from gender parity in Congress and 
state legislatures. There have never been more than nine women governors 
serving at the same time, and there has never been a Black woman governor.115 
After the 2016 election in Maryland, the state no longer had any women in its 
congressional delegation.116 So, the progress of women in formal political 
leadership roles is not inevitable. In recent times, both Hillary Clinton’s 2016 
loss after having been a clear front runner in the polls and the elimination of 
every female candidate in the 2020 Democratic primary are recent illustrations 
of this lack of progress.117 And women’s informal acts of governance, through 
exercise of their First Amendment rights and participation in free and fair 
elections, have never been fully protected and are currently under even more 
acute attack. The suffragists who could not participate in elections before 1920 
(and the many suffragists of color who could not participate even after 1920) 
used the panoply of First Amendment rights of speech, association, assembly, 
and petition to ensure that future generations of women could vote. We owe 
them no less than a continued effort to fully develop and protect those informal 
governance rights as well as our right to hold formal public office. Like the 
 
113 Ken Sugiura, Full Text: Read Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms’ Plea for Her City, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 30, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/full-text-read-atlanta-mayor-
keisha-lance-bottoms-plea-for-her-city/puDJ3iEafspuLZcbuq9rvO/ [https://perma.cc/GD54-
HAE8]. 
114 Id. 
115 See History of Women Governors, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL., 
https://cawp.rutgers.edu/history-women-governors [https://perma.cc/9M73-RPPZ] (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
116 Erin Cox, Where Are the Women to Succeed Mikulski? A ‘Leaky Pipeline’ in Md. 
Politics, BALT. SUN (Sept. 26, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com 
/features/women-to-watch/bal-maryland-women-politics-leaky-pipeline-20160926-
story.html [https://perma.cc/2TZY-W7U8]; Rachel Weiner, Van Hollen Defeats Edwards in 
Heated Maryland Primary for U.S. Senate, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/2016/04/26/ad03cdf4-0bbc-11e6-bfa1-
4efa856caf2a_story.html. 
117 See supra notes 18, 60, 68, 70 and accompanying text. 
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suffragists who knew that their struggle was intergenerational and that their 
efforts were only one piece of the long journey toward political, social, and 
economic equality, we understand that future generations will have to continue 
the work.118  
Our Constitution is particularly difficult to amend as a matter of comparative 
constitutionalism.119 Article V provides for an arduous process.120 So, what is 
the likelihood that we could engineer such constitutional redesign? It will be 
difficult. But, since the 2016 election, there have been serious discussions about 
amending the Constitution to abolish the electoral college and about taking 
action to alter the composition of the Supreme Court.121 And the current 
emergency may provide an exceptional opportunity to convince the American 
people that we have gaps in our original constitutional design. We should fill 
those gaps and complete the retrofitting of the Constitution by the Nineteenth 
Amendment. If not through the formal Article V amendment process, then we 
should act through judicial, legislative, and regulatory action to reflect the 
broader promise of a more perfect democracy where women are full participants 
in formal and informal governance. The Nineteenth Amendment’s centennial is 
an opportune time for us to have a conversation about what remains to be done 
to achieve that goal.  
 
118 See Siegel, supra note 10, at 30:08 (“For public memory then, we’ve got narratives that 
are constituting us as a community, that are creating our identity and our sense of justice, our 
sense of values as a people.”). 
119 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 139 (asserting that “most observers agree that 
the United States Constitution is one of the most rigid in the world in terms of being difficult 
to amend”). 
120 See U.S. CONST. art. V; GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 13, at 139. 
121 Josh Chafetz, Illiberal Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2020, at BR13 (reviewing 
JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE (2020)); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to 
Expanding Supreme Court, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com 
/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/SCG6-L5GY] 
(“Sens. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren and Kirsten Gillibrand told POLITICO they would 
not rule out expanding the Supreme Court if elected president, showcasing a new level of 
interest in the Democratic field on an issue that has until recently remained on the fringes of 
debate.”). 
